Dr Madibo delivered these remarks to the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan on Tuesday 25th February 2025.
On the 22nd of February this year, the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, witnessed extensive
political activity as political, civil, professional, and military forces gathered to form a new
founding coalition called the "Sudan Founding Alliance." This is a preparatory step towards
forming a government in the near future. Anyone who attended the alliance's event that
evening, which culminated in the signing of the "Political Charter and Provisional
Constitution," understands that the matter has entered into force with widespread support
from various community components across Sudan.
Such an alliance signifies the reshaping of Sudan according to the principles of liberty and
human dignity, and envisions an embedded democracy model, which rejects differentiation
among citizens based on racial, religious, or regional grounds. These ideals can only be
achieved by incorporating the concepts of secularism and federal democracy into the
constitution.
Recognition of the forthcoming government by the international community would facilitate
the provision of services and delivery of humanitarian aid to areas in Sudan inhabited by
resourceful citizens, who represent the majority of the Sudanese people who live in the
most productive belt in Sudan. It is a step for all the Sudanese rural elites to emerge from
oppressive patronage and gain independence to engage with the outside world without the
heavy hand of an ethnic and ideological minority, like the Riverine elites, that have for too
long manipulated the material and even spiritual resources of the nation.
The main challenges facing the forthcoming government are:
a) Maintaining grassroots cohesion through intensive consultations, and
b) Ensuring the removal of landmines planted by military intelligence during the rule of the
Salvation government to target specific tribes and ethnic groups,
c) Determining the selection criteria for the upcoming government and, providing services to
citizens,
d) Protecting Civilians from aerial attacks by SAF on densely populated areas.
In order for the forthcoming next government to be recognized by the international community,
we need to provide a much more thorough explanation of the root causes of Sudan’s problems,
which are structural and deeply entrenched.
1We must move beyond the rather superficial narrative currently being discussed and instead
develop an ambitious, clear-eyed discourse. This should encourage major investment partnerships, particularly those that would help address the critical issue of African and Arab food security.
Looking back at the popular uprising of December 2018, we can see that it presented an
opportunity for structural political and economic reform. Unfortunately, the civilian government that followed struggled to balance the demands of both the military and the people. However, it was Sudan’s fundamental, long-standing issues—ones I have already
mentioned—that ultimately undermined that government and continue to drive the crisis
we face today.
During a conversation with the late Salah Ibrahim Ahmed—a National Umma Party leader
and comrade of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue—he recounted speaking to al-Turabi on the
eve of the 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF). When asked how they planned to
consolidate power, al-Turabi reportedly replied: “We will impoverish the middle class, thus
debilitating the civic society which is the backbone of democracy.” This admission
underscores the NIF’s strategic use of economic policy to entrench its authority. By
expanding the state’s role in the economy, the regime deliberately dismantled Sudan’s
productive base—agriculture and industry—and shifted toward enclave economies like
mining and services. These sectors fostered rentier-parasitical behavior, enabling the
Islamists to systematically impoverish rural populations.
This economic marginalization arguably fueled decades of civil conflict, destabilizing the country for over 35 years.
This trajectory was compounded by state privatization driven by the global debt crisis and
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Islamist-aligned banks further entrenched this
system, channeling capital from Middle Eastern states into Africa. By aligning Sudan’s
economy with regional and international financial interests, the state’s role in providing
social services and economic stewardship shrank. Meanwhile, the regime weaponized
Salafi-imbued jihad against ethnic groups, notably in Southern Sudan, to engineer
demographic shifts and seize control of oil-rich regions. These wars, waged by Khartoum
to dominate Sudan’s peripheries, have left the state so weakened that meaningful reform
remains nearly impossible today.
Sudan’s case mirrors that of many developing nations in the Global South. When debt-
burdened governments faced austerity, militias became an efficient tool to suppress
restive populations.
Omar al-Bashir, like other autocrats, responded to economic pressures by privatizing state
security and outsourcing violence to paramilitary groups in Sudan’s peripheries. This
arrangement allowed the state to rely on militias for control, while militia leaders exploited
resources with impunity—a quid pro quo that sustained al-Bashir’s regime for decades.
Unsurprisingly, his successor, General al-Burhan, now replicates this blueprint.
The current war is a direct outcome of policies institutionalized during the Inghaz regime,
further entrenched by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It should not be viewed simply
as a mutiny against the state. The Sudanese state has experienced continuous decay,
accelerated by kleptocrats and security forces who have benefited from state
privatization. While Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) supporters frame their potential victory as
an end to suffering caused by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this narrative overlooks a
crucial reality: the SAF operates as a consortium of multiple militias, each of which will
eventually demand its share of power.
Although power-sharing might appear viable for the Port Sudan government in the short
term, it risks renewed armed conflict due to commitment issues and security concerns.
The military elite now positioning themselves as arbiters of justice have already caused the
displacement of millions in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and South Kordofan. This historical
context is essential for understanding the current crisis, without diminishing the suffering
of millions of innocent Sudanese affected by the ongoing war.
The SAF's military strategy over the past two years demonstrates the persistence of militia-based rule. A genuine victory for Sudan must include the elimination of all militia
governance, encompassing both the RSF and SAF. Sudan's history of conflict clearly
shows that delegating war management to military and armed groups undermines long-
term peace prospects. The separation of South Sudan serves as a cautionary example,
where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed because it entrusted the peace process
entirely to combatants while neglecting the political dimension.
Moving forward, Sudan must avoid repeating past mistakes through a comprehensive
national reconciliation process. This process should include Sudanese people from all
ethnic and religious backgrounds, addressing both current and historical grievances that
have affected millions across Khartoum, Al-Jazeera, Sennar, Darfur, and Kordofan. Every
Sudanese citizen deserves the opportunity to live peacefully and aspire to a better future.
Collaboration and dialogue between various factions, particularly those in opposition, is crucial to prevent further succession attempts.
To the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Sudan & South Sudan, I recommend that
the UK Parliament support the Sudan Founding Alliance's vision for a peaceful, democratic
Sudan by prioritizing recognition of the forthcoming government and encouraging
international partnerships. The new coalition, rooted in secularism and federal democracy,
aims to reshape Sudan based on human dignity and equality, marking a critical shift from
the ethnic and ideological domination of the past. To foster stability, the UK should
advocate for a national reconciliation process that addresses historical grievances,
supports the dismantling of militia-based governance, and ensures broad representation in
the new government. Furthermore, the UK can assist by facilitating humanitarian aid and
investment in Sudan’s development, particularly in sectors related to food security and infrastructure, vital for Sudan's recovery and long-term peace.
Dr Madibo delivered these remarks to the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan on Tuesday 25th February 2025.
On the 22nd of February this year, the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, witnessed extensive
political activity as political, civil, professional, and military forces gathered to form a new
founding coalition called the "Sudan Founding Alliance." This is a preparatory step towards
forming a government in the near future. Anyone who attended the alliance's event that
evening, which culminated in the signing of the "Political Charter and Provisional
Constitution," understands that the matter has entered into force with widespread support
from various community components across Sudan.
Such an alliance signifies the reshaping of Sudan according to the principles of liberty and
human dignity, and envisions an embedded democracy model, which rejects differentiation
among citizens based on racial, religious, or regional grounds. These ideals can only be
achieved by incorporating the concepts of secularism and federal democracy into the
constitution.
Recognition of the forthcoming government by the international community would facilitate
the provision of services and delivery of humanitarian aid to areas in Sudan inhabited by
resourceful citizens, who represent the majority of the Sudanese people who live in the
most productive belt in Sudan. It is a step for all the Sudanese rural elites to emerge from
oppressive patronage and gain independence to engage with the outside world without the
heavy hand of an ethnic and ideological minority, like the Riverine elites, that have for too
long manipulated the material and even spiritual resources of the nation.
The main challenges facing the forthcoming government are:
a) Maintaining grassroots cohesion through intensive consultations, and
b) Ensuring the removal of landmines planted by military intelligence during the rule of the
Salvation government to target specific tribes and ethnic groups,
c) Determining the selection criteria for the upcoming government and, providing services to
citizens,
d) Protecting Civilians from aerial attacks by SAF on densely populated areas.
In order for the forthcoming next government to be recognized by the international community,
we need to provide a much more thorough explanation of the root causes of Sudan’s problems,
which are structural and deeply entrenched.
1We must move beyond the rather superficial narrative currently being discussed and instead
develop an ambitious, clear-eyed discourse. This should encourage major investment partnerships, particularly those that would help address the critical issue of African and Arab food security.
Looking back at the popular uprising of December 2018, we can see that it presented an
opportunity for structural political and economic reform. Unfortunately, the civilian government that followed struggled to balance the demands of both the military and the people. However, it was Sudan’s fundamental, long-standing issues—ones I have already
mentioned—that ultimately undermined that government and continue to drive the crisis
we face today.
During a conversation with the late Salah Ibrahim Ahmed—a National Umma Party leader
and comrade of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue—he recounted speaking to al-Turabi on the
eve of the 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF). When asked how they planned to
consolidate power, al-Turabi reportedly replied: “We will impoverish the middle class, thus
debilitating the civic society which is the backbone of democracy.” This admission
underscores the NIF’s strategic use of economic policy to entrench its authority. By
expanding the state’s role in the economy, the regime deliberately dismantled Sudan’s
productive base—agriculture and industry—and shifted toward enclave economies like
mining and services. These sectors fostered rentier-parasitical behavior, enabling the
Islamists to systematically impoverish rural populations.
This economic marginalization arguably fueled decades of civil conflict, destabilizing the country for over 35 years.
This trajectory was compounded by state privatization driven by the global debt crisis and
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Islamist-aligned banks further entrenched this
system, channeling capital from Middle Eastern states into Africa. By aligning Sudan’s
economy with regional and international financial interests, the state’s role in providing
social services and economic stewardship shrank. Meanwhile, the regime weaponized
Salafi-imbued jihad against ethnic groups, notably in Southern Sudan, to engineer
demographic shifts and seize control of oil-rich regions. These wars, waged by Khartoum
to dominate Sudan’s peripheries, have left the state so weakened that meaningful reform
remains nearly impossible today.
Sudan’s case mirrors that of many developing nations in the Global South. When debt-
burdened governments faced austerity, militias became an efficient tool to suppress
restive populations.
Omar al-Bashir, like other autocrats, responded to economic pressures by privatizing state
security and outsourcing violence to paramilitary groups in Sudan’s peripheries. This
arrangement allowed the state to rely on militias for control, while militia leaders exploited
resources with impunity—a quid pro quo that sustained al-Bashir’s regime for decades.
Unsurprisingly, his successor, General al-Burhan, now replicates this blueprint.
The current war is a direct outcome of policies institutionalized during the Inghaz regime,
further entrenched by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It should not be viewed simply
as a mutiny against the state. The Sudanese state has experienced continuous decay,
accelerated by kleptocrats and security forces who have benefited from state
privatization. While Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) supporters frame their potential victory as
an end to suffering caused by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this narrative overlooks a
crucial reality: the SAF operates as a consortium of multiple militias, each of which will
eventually demand its share of power.
Although power-sharing might appear viable for the Port Sudan government in the short
term, it risks renewed armed conflict due to commitment issues and security concerns.
The military elite now positioning themselves as arbiters of justice have already caused the
displacement of millions in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and South Kordofan. This historical
context is essential for understanding the current crisis, without diminishing the suffering
of millions of innocent Sudanese affected by the ongoing war.
The SAF's military strategy over the past two years demonstrates the persistence of militia-based rule. A genuine victory for Sudan must include the elimination of all militia
governance, encompassing both the RSF and SAF. Sudan's history of conflict clearly
shows that delegating war management to military and armed groups undermines long-
term peace prospects. The separation of South Sudan serves as a cautionary example,
where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed because it entrusted the peace process
entirely to combatants while neglecting the political dimension.
Moving forward, Sudan must avoid repeating past mistakes through a comprehensive
national reconciliation process. This process should include Sudanese people from all
ethnic and religious backgrounds, addressing both current and historical grievances that
have affected millions across Khartoum, Al-Jazeera, Sennar, Darfur, and Kordofan. Every
Sudanese citizen deserves the opportunity to live peacefully and aspire to a better future.
Collaboration and dialogue between various factions, particularly those in opposition, is crucial to prevent further succession attempts.
To the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Sudan & South Sudan, I recommend that
the UK Parliament support the Sudan Founding Alliance's vision for a peaceful, democratic
Sudan by prioritizing recognition of the forthcoming government and encouraging
international partnerships. The new coalition, rooted in secularism and federal democracy,
aims to reshape Sudan based on human dignity and equality, marking a critical shift from
the ethnic and ideological domination of the past. To foster stability, the UK should
advocate for a national reconciliation process that addresses historical grievances,
supports the dismantling of militia-based governance, and ensures broad representation in
the new government. Furthermore, the UK can assist by facilitating humanitarian aid and
investment in Sudan’s development, particularly in sectors related to food security and infrastructure, vital for Sudan's recovery and long-term peace.
Dr Madibo delivered these remarks to the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan on Tuesday 25th February 2025.
On the 22nd of February this year, the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, witnessed extensive
political activity as political, civil, professional, and military forces gathered to form a new
founding coalition called the "Sudan Founding Alliance." This is a preparatory step towards
forming a government in the near future. Anyone who attended the alliance's event that
evening, which culminated in the signing of the "Political Charter and Provisional
Constitution," understands that the matter has entered into force with widespread support
from various community components across Sudan.
Such an alliance signifies the reshaping of Sudan according to the principles of liberty and
human dignity, and envisions an embedded democracy model, which rejects differentiation
among citizens based on racial, religious, or regional grounds. These ideals can only be
achieved by incorporating the concepts of secularism and federal democracy into the
constitution.
Recognition of the forthcoming government by the international community would facilitate
the provision of services and delivery of humanitarian aid to areas in Sudan inhabited by
resourceful citizens, who represent the majority of the Sudanese people who live in the
most productive belt in Sudan. It is a step for all the Sudanese rural elites to emerge from
oppressive patronage and gain independence to engage with the outside world without the
heavy hand of an ethnic and ideological minority, like the Riverine elites, that have for too
long manipulated the material and even spiritual resources of the nation.
The main challenges facing the forthcoming government are:
a) Maintaining grassroots cohesion through intensive consultations, and
b) Ensuring the removal of landmines planted by military intelligence during the rule of the
Salvation government to target specific tribes and ethnic groups,
c) Determining the selection criteria for the upcoming government and, providing services to
citizens,
d) Protecting Civilians from aerial attacks by SAF on densely populated areas.
In order for the forthcoming next government to be recognized by the international community,
we need to provide a much more thorough explanation of the root causes of Sudan’s problems,
which are structural and deeply entrenched.
1We must move beyond the rather superficial narrative currently being discussed and instead
develop an ambitious, clear-eyed discourse. This should encourage major investment partnerships, particularly those that would help address the critical issue of African and Arab food security.
Looking back at the popular uprising of December 2018, we can see that it presented an
opportunity for structural political and economic reform. Unfortunately, the civilian government that followed struggled to balance the demands of both the military and the people. However, it was Sudan’s fundamental, long-standing issues—ones I have already
mentioned—that ultimately undermined that government and continue to drive the crisis
we face today.
During a conversation with the late Salah Ibrahim Ahmed—a National Umma Party leader
and comrade of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue—he recounted speaking to al-Turabi on the
eve of the 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF). When asked how they planned to
consolidate power, al-Turabi reportedly replied: “We will impoverish the middle class, thus
debilitating the civic society which is the backbone of democracy.” This admission
underscores the NIF’s strategic use of economic policy to entrench its authority. By
expanding the state’s role in the economy, the regime deliberately dismantled Sudan’s
productive base—agriculture and industry—and shifted toward enclave economies like
mining and services. These sectors fostered rentier-parasitical behavior, enabling the
Islamists to systematically impoverish rural populations.
This economic marginalization arguably fueled decades of civil conflict, destabilizing the country for over 35 years.
This trajectory was compounded by state privatization driven by the global debt crisis and
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Islamist-aligned banks further entrenched this
system, channeling capital from Middle Eastern states into Africa. By aligning Sudan’s
economy with regional and international financial interests, the state’s role in providing
social services and economic stewardship shrank. Meanwhile, the regime weaponized
Salafi-imbued jihad against ethnic groups, notably in Southern Sudan, to engineer
demographic shifts and seize control of oil-rich regions. These wars, waged by Khartoum
to dominate Sudan’s peripheries, have left the state so weakened that meaningful reform
remains nearly impossible today.
Sudan’s case mirrors that of many developing nations in the Global South. When debt-
burdened governments faced austerity, militias became an efficient tool to suppress
restive populations.
Omar al-Bashir, like other autocrats, responded to economic pressures by privatizing state
security and outsourcing violence to paramilitary groups in Sudan’s peripheries. This
arrangement allowed the state to rely on militias for control, while militia leaders exploited
resources with impunity—a quid pro quo that sustained al-Bashir’s regime for decades.
Unsurprisingly, his successor, General al-Burhan, now replicates this blueprint.
The current war is a direct outcome of policies institutionalized during the Inghaz regime,
further entrenched by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It should not be viewed simply
as a mutiny against the state. The Sudanese state has experienced continuous decay,
accelerated by kleptocrats and security forces who have benefited from state
privatization. While Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) supporters frame their potential victory as
an end to suffering caused by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this narrative overlooks a
crucial reality: the SAF operates as a consortium of multiple militias, each of which will
eventually demand its share of power.
Although power-sharing might appear viable for the Port Sudan government in the short
term, it risks renewed armed conflict due to commitment issues and security concerns.
The military elite now positioning themselves as arbiters of justice have already caused the
displacement of millions in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and South Kordofan. This historical
context is essential for understanding the current crisis, without diminishing the suffering
of millions of innocent Sudanese affected by the ongoing war.
The SAF's military strategy over the past two years demonstrates the persistence of militia-based rule. A genuine victory for Sudan must include the elimination of all militia
governance, encompassing both the RSF and SAF. Sudan's history of conflict clearly
shows that delegating war management to military and armed groups undermines long-
term peace prospects. The separation of South Sudan serves as a cautionary example,
where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed because it entrusted the peace process
entirely to combatants while neglecting the political dimension.
Moving forward, Sudan must avoid repeating past mistakes through a comprehensive
national reconciliation process. This process should include Sudanese people from all
ethnic and religious backgrounds, addressing both current and historical grievances that
have affected millions across Khartoum, Al-Jazeera, Sennar, Darfur, and Kordofan. Every
Sudanese citizen deserves the opportunity to live peacefully and aspire to a better future.
Collaboration and dialogue between various factions, particularly those in opposition, is crucial to prevent further succession attempts.
To the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Sudan & South Sudan, I recommend that
the UK Parliament support the Sudan Founding Alliance's vision for a peaceful, democratic
Sudan by prioritizing recognition of the forthcoming government and encouraging
international partnerships. The new coalition, rooted in secularism and federal democracy,
aims to reshape Sudan based on human dignity and equality, marking a critical shift from
the ethnic and ideological domination of the past. To foster stability, the UK should
advocate for a national reconciliation process that addresses historical grievances,
supports the dismantling of militia-based governance, and ensures broad representation in
the new government. Furthermore, the UK can assist by facilitating humanitarian aid and
investment in Sudan’s development, particularly in sectors related to food security and infrastructure, vital for Sudan's recovery and long-term peace.
Dr Madibo delivered these remarks to the UK's All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan on Tuesday 25th February 2025.
On the 22nd of February this year, the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, witnessed extensive
political activity as political, civil, professional, and military forces gathered to form a new
founding coalition called the "Sudan Founding Alliance." This is a preparatory step towards
forming a government in the near future. Anyone who attended the alliance's event that
evening, which culminated in the signing of the "Political Charter and Provisional
Constitution," understands that the matter has entered into force with widespread support
from various community components across Sudan.
Such an alliance signifies the reshaping of Sudan according to the principles of liberty and
human dignity, and envisions an embedded democracy model, which rejects differentiation
among citizens based on racial, religious, or regional grounds. These ideals can only be
achieved by incorporating the concepts of secularism and federal democracy into the
constitution.
Recognition of the forthcoming government by the international community would facilitate
the provision of services and delivery of humanitarian aid to areas in Sudan inhabited by
resourceful citizens, who represent the majority of the Sudanese people who live in the
most productive belt in Sudan. It is a step for all the Sudanese rural elites to emerge from
oppressive patronage and gain independence to engage with the outside world without the
heavy hand of an ethnic and ideological minority, like the Riverine elites, that have for too
long manipulated the material and even spiritual resources of the nation.
The main challenges facing the forthcoming government are:
a) Maintaining grassroots cohesion through intensive consultations, and
b) Ensuring the removal of landmines planted by military intelligence during the rule of the
Salvation government to target specific tribes and ethnic groups,
c) Determining the selection criteria for the upcoming government and, providing services to
citizens,
d) Protecting Civilians from aerial attacks by SAF on densely populated areas.
In order for the forthcoming next government to be recognized by the international community,
we need to provide a much more thorough explanation of the root causes of Sudan’s problems,
which are structural and deeply entrenched.
1We must move beyond the rather superficial narrative currently being discussed and instead
develop an ambitious, clear-eyed discourse. This should encourage major investment partnerships, particularly those that would help address the critical issue of African and Arab food security.
Looking back at the popular uprising of December 2018, we can see that it presented an
opportunity for structural political and economic reform. Unfortunately, the civilian government that followed struggled to balance the demands of both the military and the people. However, it was Sudan’s fundamental, long-standing issues—ones I have already
mentioned—that ultimately undermined that government and continue to drive the crisis
we face today.
During a conversation with the late Salah Ibrahim Ahmed—a National Umma Party leader
and comrade of Hassan al-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue—he recounted speaking to al-Turabi on the
eve of the 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front (NIF). When asked how they planned to
consolidate power, al-Turabi reportedly replied: “We will impoverish the middle class, thus
debilitating the civic society which is the backbone of democracy.” This admission
underscores the NIF’s strategic use of economic policy to entrench its authority. By
expanding the state’s role in the economy, the regime deliberately dismantled Sudan’s
productive base—agriculture and industry—and shifted toward enclave economies like
mining and services. These sectors fostered rentier-parasitical behavior, enabling the
Islamists to systematically impoverish rural populations.
This economic marginalization arguably fueled decades of civil conflict, destabilizing the country for over 35 years.
This trajectory was compounded by state privatization driven by the global debt crisis and
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Islamist-aligned banks further entrenched this
system, channeling capital from Middle Eastern states into Africa. By aligning Sudan’s
economy with regional and international financial interests, the state’s role in providing
social services and economic stewardship shrank. Meanwhile, the regime weaponized
Salafi-imbued jihad against ethnic groups, notably in Southern Sudan, to engineer
demographic shifts and seize control of oil-rich regions. These wars, waged by Khartoum
to dominate Sudan’s peripheries, have left the state so weakened that meaningful reform
remains nearly impossible today.
Sudan’s case mirrors that of many developing nations in the Global South. When debt-
burdened governments faced austerity, militias became an efficient tool to suppress
restive populations.
Omar al-Bashir, like other autocrats, responded to economic pressures by privatizing state
security and outsourcing violence to paramilitary groups in Sudan’s peripheries. This
arrangement allowed the state to rely on militias for control, while militia leaders exploited
resources with impunity—a quid pro quo that sustained al-Bashir’s regime for decades.
Unsurprisingly, his successor, General al-Burhan, now replicates this blueprint.
The current war is a direct outcome of policies institutionalized during the Inghaz regime,
further entrenched by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). It should not be viewed simply
as a mutiny against the state. The Sudanese state has experienced continuous decay,
accelerated by kleptocrats and security forces who have benefited from state
privatization. While Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) supporters frame their potential victory as
an end to suffering caused by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), this narrative overlooks a
crucial reality: the SAF operates as a consortium of multiple militias, each of which will
eventually demand its share of power.
Although power-sharing might appear viable for the Port Sudan government in the short
term, it risks renewed armed conflict due to commitment issues and security concerns.
The military elite now positioning themselves as arbiters of justice have already caused the
displacement of millions in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and South Kordofan. This historical
context is essential for understanding the current crisis, without diminishing the suffering
of millions of innocent Sudanese affected by the ongoing war.
The SAF's military strategy over the past two years demonstrates the persistence of militia-based rule. A genuine victory for Sudan must include the elimination of all militia
governance, encompassing both the RSF and SAF. Sudan's history of conflict clearly
shows that delegating war management to military and armed groups undermines long-
term peace prospects. The separation of South Sudan serves as a cautionary example,
where the Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed because it entrusted the peace process
entirely to combatants while neglecting the political dimension.
Moving forward, Sudan must avoid repeating past mistakes through a comprehensive
national reconciliation process. This process should include Sudanese people from all
ethnic and religious backgrounds, addressing both current and historical grievances that
have affected millions across Khartoum, Al-Jazeera, Sennar, Darfur, and Kordofan. Every
Sudanese citizen deserves the opportunity to live peacefully and aspire to a better future.
Collaboration and dialogue between various factions, particularly those in opposition, is crucial to prevent further succession attempts.
To the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Sudan & South Sudan, I recommend that
the UK Parliament support the Sudan Founding Alliance's vision for a peaceful, democratic
Sudan by prioritizing recognition of the forthcoming government and encouraging
international partnerships. The new coalition, rooted in secularism and federal democracy,
aims to reshape Sudan based on human dignity and equality, marking a critical shift from
the ethnic and ideological domination of the past. To foster stability, the UK should
advocate for a national reconciliation process that addresses historical grievances,
supports the dismantling of militia-based governance, and ensures broad representation in
the new government. Furthermore, the UK can assist by facilitating humanitarian aid and
investment in Sudan’s development, particularly in sectors related to food security and infrastructure, vital for Sudan's recovery and long-term peace.
